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February 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: PL - Joseph O'Connell

FROM: P/DH - Saul S. Gefter

SUBJECT: Boston Weekly Article Entitled  
"Cold Warriors"

As you are aware, I feel there are a number of inaccuracies, innuendos, and half-truths contained in Art Jahnke's piece. However, I believe that we should not respond at this time while negotiations with the Government of Pakistan and Inter-Agency conversations are going on regarding the future of the project.

bcc: P/D - John Mosher

P/D:SGefter:vp:0590A

*See Memo of  
2/2 O'Connell  
re same subject*

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United States Information Agency  
Under the Freedom of Information  
Act. Date \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 1 1988

*BU wanted Art Jahnke to go to Pakistan to teach journalism to Afghan freedom fighters. But first Jahnke wanted to know what was going on at BU, where disinformation was the order of the day.*

# Cold Warriors

BY ART JAHNKE

**Y**OU WILL NEVER REGRET THIS," JOACHIM MAITRE told me late last fall. "This is the kind of thing that can be very good for your career."

Maitre was leaning against a desk in an abandoned office in the basement of Boston University's College of Communication (COM). An athletic man with a Kissingeresque German accent, Maitre was being charming to the point of flirtatiousness.

I glanced at Nick Mills, sitting at the other desk in the tiny office, and I wondered if he had been uninking about his career when he signed on to teach photojournalism to Afghan political refugees in Pakistan. Why not? The Nick Mills I knew had been a combat photographer and a radio newsman.

Before Maitre joined us, I had asked Mills what he really thought about the Afghan Media Project, which was created by a congressional committee in July 1985 to help pierce the news blackout the Soviets had imposed when they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Specifically, I asked what Mills made of the fact that the United States Information Agency (USIA), the public relations branch of the federal government, was footing the bill.

Mills assured me that the project was squeaky clean and that the USIA had promised to stay out of his way. He was going for one reason, he said. Adventure.

I could see that. Peshawar. A Pakistani border town filled with Afghan freedom fighters, gunrunners, drug smugglers, spies, and counterspies. In fact, the adventure promised by the Afghan Media Project looked irresistible. And BU, my alma mater, was offering to pay me \$800 a week, plus a generous per diem allowance, to spend six weeks teaching journalism to a dozen refugees who spoke Pashto and Dari but probably not English. It sounded like an adventure to me.

"I'm interested," I told Maitre. "I'll let you know for sure in a couple of days."

After Maitre left the room, Mills gave me a quick course in the recent history of H. Joachim Jahnke, known to his friends as Yo. Maitre was appointed interim dean of the college in August 1986, after Dean Bernard Redmont quit in a huff over the Afghan Media Project. Mills said that Maitre was an East German defector close to Boston University president John Silber. In fact, Maitre once taught Silber how to ski at Sugar-

bush, in Vermont, where he works as a part-time instructor. Mills had worked for Maitre before, he told me, when he narrated a procontra documentary that Maitre produced. Maitre's film, I would learn, was paid for by the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, a right-wing pressure group that is alleged to have received some of the profits from the U.S. arms sales to Iran that were arranged by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, a Washington acquaintance of Maitre's.

Through the thin office walls, I heard Professor Lawrence M. Martin (as he is listed in the COM faculty directory) talking on the phone. I knew him as Larry Martin from my days as a graduate student, back when COM was called the School of Public Communications, but I knew that was not his real name. His real name is Ladislav Bittman, and he had been a Czech intelligence agent until he defected, in 1968. Martin's most recent accomplishment is the creation at BU of the nation's first Disinformation Documentation Center.

It seemed I didn't have to go to Peshawar to be surrounded by mysterious political operatives. There was a Czech defector in the office next door, and a library full of disinformation across the hall. And I was getting career advice from an East German defector, a college dean who made propaganda movies for the Nicaraguan contras.

Strange things seemed to be happening at BU. It was as if the entire College of Communication had slipped back in time, back to the shadowy days of the cold war. It was time to do some intelligence work of my own.

Why, I wanted to know, had Bernard Redmont tossed a prestigious deanship out the window to take over a BU internship program in London?

How could anybody think that a crash course in media would turn a class of Afghan refugees into credible journalists?

How had a few stalwart anticommunists won so much official support that the college that had been known to BU students as COM suddenly became known as "anti-COM"?

And why were they recruiting me?

I made some calls to former professors at COM and asked a few questions about Redmont's resignation. One said it had to do with the Afghan Media Project. Another said he lost a power struggle with Maitre. Someone else said Redmont was squeezed out by Silber's lieutenant, provost Jon Westling.

**Dean Redmont knew that someone was digging into his past. Two of his professors had told him that rumors were being spread. Of course, Redmont knew what the rumors were, and he knew who was spreading them.**

I called Redmont in London. He wasn't talking—at least not on the record. But what Redmont did give me, a fragmented history of the rise of the New Right at one of the country's top journalism schools, was very different from the narrative I would hear from COM associate dean Ronald S. Goldman.

But such disparities are not uncommon in the world of disinformation.

**B**ERNARD REDMONT AND RONALD GOLDMAN WERE NEVER friends. Yet Redmont saw enough in Goldman to promote him, in September 1985, from assistant dean of academic and student affairs to associate dean of the College of Communication. Goldman was appreciative. He wanted to do his new job well, and one of the things that Goldman thought had been neglected by his predecessor was the procurement of federal grants. In the five years before Goldman's appointment, the College of Communication had won no major government grant. That wasn't the kind of record to impress John Silber.

So on September 11, when Goldman received a copy of the *Federal Register* in which the USIA requested "concept papers" for something called the Afghan Media Project, he read on: "It is the goal of this project to facilitate the collection, development and distribution of credible, objective and timely professional-quality news stories, photographs and television images about developments in Afghanistan in an effort to overcome the substantial obstacles encountered by media representatives in bringing the story to world attention."

Goldman sensed an opportunity. Before writing the concept paper, he tapped the expertise of several faculty members including Larry Martin, COM's expert on disinformation; associate dean Jasper K. Smith; Otto Lerbinger, author of *Designs for Persuasive Communication and Information, Influence and Communication*; Henry G. LaBrie III, an assistant professor who had taken part in other USIA programs; and H. Joachim Maitre, then a professor of Journalism and International Relations.

Maitre was the man Goldman relied upon most heavily to win the Afghan project—and the grant money—for BU. Maitre's credentials included experience as a journalist covering the third world. His Washington contacts included the director of the USIA, Charles Z. Wick, whom he had met through publishing connections in West Germany. And his politics were resolutely anticommunist. In fact, Maitre was every bit as anticommunist as Senator Gordon Humphrey, the conservative New Hampshire Republican who sponsored the legislation to allocate \$20,000 to "promote the development of an independent media service by the Afghan people and to provide for the training of Afghans in media and media-related fields."

The idea was to get some coverage of a war that was, Humphrey felt, getting precious little coverage in the world press. Since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 2.6 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan, forming the largest refugee community in the world. Afghan freedom fighters, the *mujahideen*, were still battling the Soviet occupiers, but few journalists were reporting the story, largely because the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan had warned that any journalist who tried to penetrate the Soviet-imposed news blackout would be shot on sight. Humphrey's idea, and the USIA's goal, was to take a group of refugees, teach them basic journalism

skills, and then to set them up with their own "independent" news agency.

On September 24, 1985, Goldman sent his concept paper to the USIA offering to train Afghan refugees at BU.

And at BU the COM faculty began to split in two.

**N**EITHER GOLDMAN, JASPER SMITH, HENRY LABRIE, NOR Joachim Maitre claims to understand the storm of protest that erupted over the Afghan project. I stopped by the office of my former newswriting teacher, associate professor Jon Klarfeld, and he acted as if the entire journalism department had been stricken by some kind of ethical Saint Vitus' Dance. If I wanted to get the opposition line, he said, I should talk to Bernice Buresh.

Bernice Buresh, a former *Newsweek* Boston bureau chief, is an associate professor of journalism at BU who specializes in politics and civil rights issues. "It's a USIA project," said Buresh, "and it is a USIA propaganda project. There is no argument that the Soviet Union is simply ghastly in what it is doing [in Afghanistan], but people who are interested in journalism should understand that we have a long tradition, in this country, of independent journalists. Journalism is a process of inquiry and description. It's very different from propaganda. Propaganda is goal-oriented. The USIA isn't there [in Pakistan] because they want the *mujahideen* to learn journalism; they are there to conduct a propaganda effort against the Soviet Union."

*Propaganda*, a nasty word among journalists, began to echo around the College of Communication shortly after Goldman sent his package to the USIA.

The USIA, after all, had grown increasingly controversial ever since 1981, when President Reagan appointed Charles Z. Wick as its director. (Wick was an old Hollywood friend of the president's who had produced the movie *Snow White and the Three Stooges*.) Under Wick the USIA began to zealously apply an old agency regulation that prohibited movies that lent themselves to "misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the United States" from getting a USIA educational certificate, which is important for the distribution of films abroad. More than 148 films have been denied certification under Wick, including the Emmy Award-winning *Whatever Happened to Childhood?*—a documentary about drugs and kids in America. Other films denied USIA certification have dealt with American policy in Central America, atomic energy, abortion, and Agent Orange.

In the warren of offices at BU's College of Communication, professors like Bernice Buresh and others worried that the USIA would apply the same ideological criteria to news that was produced and disseminated by the Afghan Media Project. And Dean Bernard Redmont was among them.

**O**N FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1985, COM GOT THE NEWS FROM SAUL S. GEFTER, director of the Afghan Media Project for the USIA. COM's concept paper was one of five finalists. Gefter's letter warned that the deadline for grant proposals was only three weeks away, and then offered some advice: if BU really wanted the grant, its proposal should emphasize the training of Afghans in Peshawar rather than in the United States. (Continued on page 163)

(Continued from page 114)

The following Wednesday, Smith and Goldman met with Redmont to discuss college business, including the business of the Afghan Media Project. Jasper Smith, a tall former public relations man with a soft southern accent, suggested that Joachim Maitre be appointed project director. Maitre had plenty of firsthand experience in the third world—he had been a reporter in Africa, Vietnam, and Central America—and he had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Afghan program from the start. Goldman agreed. Maitre, he said, was the man most qualified for the job.

But Redmont had serious misgivings about Joachim Maitre. One student had told Redmont that Maitre's course on Reporting Military Affairs was primarily concerned with how to prevent the press from reporting on military affairs. And when Redmont had dropped in for a routine visit to one of Maitre's classes, he had reacted angrily and later complained that his teaching was being unfairly criticized.

Then there were the gold-braided hats from the USS *Bunker Hill* and the USS *Nimitz* that Maitre kept in his office, and his predilection for dressing up in military camouflage to be photographed with the

contingent. Maitre, Redmont said, "Maitre would most likely go off half-cocked in Peshawar."

Redmont have another person in mind? Not really. In fact, Redmont did not seem interested in pursuing the Afghan project at all, especially if it were to be conducted in Pakistan.

Redmont was a liberal, laid-back administrator. He had been a print and broadcast journalist for 40 years and had been a foreign correspondent in Paris and Buenos Aires. He had been the CBS bureau chief in Moscow. He was 67 years old, and he was cruising toward retirement.

Maitre was 51 years old and ambitious. A conservative, he was an autocratic teacher. He still recalled with resentment how as a child in East Germany he and his classmates had been forced to sign letters to President Truman protesting the death sentences of Communists Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who had been convicted of treason for giving nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union in 1953. At the age of 19, Maitre had fled to West Germany.

When Maitre learned that Redmont was backing off from the Afghan Media Project, he went over his head. He wrote a letter arguing that the grant should not be allowed to get away, and he sent it to his friend John Silber.

Maitre's letter to Silber set him in bold opposition to Dean Redmont. The next thing Goldman knew, BU provost Jon Westling was on the phone with a slew of questions about the status of the Afghan project. Then it was Redmont on the phone,

wondering why Goldman had taken it upon himself to inform Provost Westling of Redmont's views about the Afghan project.

It was a tricky day for Ronald Goldman.

AT 9:30 ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 22, a week before the deadline for BU's Afghan proposal, Redmont called Goldman into his office. Redmont informed Goldman that he had called the USIA to withdraw the college from consideration for the Afghan Media Project. Goldman was flabbergasted. The news, he says, "was like a bullet to the head." Goldman considered the proposal his, not Redmont's. He felt Redmont had no right to interfere, particularly since he had allowed Goldman, Maitre, and LaBrie to work against the clock to complete the proposal.

"Have you told the provost?" Goldman asked.

Redmont said he would tell Westling, but did not. Instead, he left for New York. The provost, after learning from Goldman about the dean's call to the USIA, eventually called Redmont to press for the Afghan project. Then Redmont did some calling of his own—to 10 faculty members who shared his concerns about conducting the teaching program in Pakistan. Redmont asked them to meet at his Brookline apartment early Monday morning, November 25. There, over bagels and orange juice, he lobbied for their support. One of those present, William V. Shannon, a former ambassador to Ireland and a contributor to the *Boston Globe's* editorial and op-ed pages, composed a letter (later signed by all 10 faculty members) to Westling recommending that President Silber attempt to persuade USIA director Wick that the teaching should take place at BU.

"We are unanimously of the view that a program conducted in Peshawar could not be satisfactorily administered, would be open to infiltration and surveillance by agents of the KGB, the Iranian government, and other governments hostile to the United States, and would pose serious risks to the reputation of the University and the College," Shannon wrote. "The gravest risk is that the program would be seen by the outside world and by the American academic community as not an educational enterprise at all but as a venture in propaganda and counterintelligence."

Silber's response was to cover all bets. He told Redmont to submit a proposal for teaching the Afghan refugees on the BU campus. Silber then said that he himself would submit another proposal, one designed by Joachim Maitre, to train the refugees in Peshawar under the auspices of Boston University, not the College of Communication.

The two teams set to work, and both proposals were sent on their way on December 9, 1985. And so was Goldman. At 5 p.m. on December 9, Redmont called Goldman

into his office to fire him.

On February 4, 1986, the USIA awarded the Afghan project to BU for its proposal to train refugees in Peshawar.

Maitre's team set right to work studying the examples of journalistic efforts of the refugees at the Afghan Information Centre (AIC) in Peshawar that had been sent by the USIA. The writing wasn't stylish, but the information was fascinating. The AIC Monthly Bulletin for October 1985 contained the following report:

On October 5 at 20:30 p.m., Kabul Radio announced officially that the secretariat of the Central Committee presided over by Babrak Karmal discussed in an emergency meeting the report of the 'commission for the party control' about unsatisfactory and anti-party activity of some government officials of Logar Province. In a long and angry resolution, anti-revolutionary elements were denounced, and high-ranking officials of the provincial government were named. Some were dismissed and many were expelled from the party and put under trial by the Revolutionary Court.

That was the kind of information available only to the *mujahideen*: tales of the power struggles within the Central Committee, pictures of an oppressive bureaucracy rife with petty rivalries and ambitious administrators.

It all bore a discomfiting resemblance to BU's College of Communication.

DEAN REDMONT KNEW THAT SOMEONE was digging into his past. During the spring semester of 1986, more than one COM professor had warned him that dangerous rumors were being spread. Of course, Redmont knew what the rumors were, and he was fairly certain who was behind them. He suspected Goldman, Smith, or Maitre.

Goldman, despite his dismissal, had never stopped coming to his office just two doors down from Redmont's. He was working on personal projects, often concerning journalism in South Africa, where he was born, while awaiting reassignment by Provost Westling. Sometime in the winter of 1986, about the time that students at COM started referring to their college as "anti-COM," Goldman did something he now calls lingo-like. You have to understand, says Goldman, "This guy [Redmont] set out to destroy me. I wanted to understand him. I wanted to try to figure out who this man was."

"I heard from somebody in New York that there was something funny about that guy's past. So I went out and started to look up what is available in the library. I just picked up books on the fifties."

Goldman, together with Smith, found

New York Times clips from 1951 claiming that Bernard Redmont had once been accused of being a member of the Communist party. In 1945, Goldman learned, a confessed Soviet spy named Elizabeth T. Bentley gave FBI investigators the names of 17 State Department officials who she claimed were Soviet spies. They included Alger Hiss, William W. Remington, and a 27-year-old news writer for the State Department's Office of Inter-American Affairs named Bernard Redmont.

Five years later, at Remington's trial, Redmont had testified that he was not and had never been a Communist, and that he had never been a spy for the Soviet Union.

Goldman and Smith took the information back to Goldman's office, where they decided to share it with Henry LaBrie and Joachim Maitre. It was ammunition in case they needed it.

ON TUESDAY, MARCH 11, THE COM FACULTY met in room 106. Redmont filled them in on the state of the Afghan Media Project. His own proposal to train refugees in Boston had been rejected, he said, in favor of Silber's frontier classroom. He explained that the training would be conducted under the auspices of Boston University, not the College of Communication, and that the Hearst Corporation's King Features Syndicate would set up an agency to disseminate the news produced by the new Afghan reporters.

"Those faculty members who wish to be involved in the other project are free to do so," Redmont told his faculty. "If participation requires course release, please advise the appropriate deans as soon as possible."

He then asked for comment. Professor Bernard Rubin took the floor. Rubin, an expert on media and politics, had not once been consulted about the Afghan Media Project, although he was a former chief of the Research Design Division of the USIA, a specialist on the third world, and the author of several books including *Questioning Media Ethics* and *Media Politics and Democracy*.

"The respected associate dean [Ronald Goldman], we are told, is cashiered," Rubin began. "If it was a faculty member, it would be clear; it would be punishment. I think we have to assure our administrators that they are not punished for their views, whether they acquiesce or take an alternate view."

Rubin said he got a hint of what was happening when he received a letter from Redmont advising him that no faculty member was ever to bypass the dean in any college business. "That letter reminds me of my grandfather," said Rubin. "He used to give the grandchildren a whack, saying that someday you'll do something bad when I won't be able to catch you, so you might as well get hit now."

Rubin went on to argue that since the Soviets were murdering an entire people—sending in helicopters, dropping mines, tearing off limbs—it would be a good idea to tell the world, and he felt that COM should be involved.

"If there is some odorous, horrific, repulsive reason behind it [the project], let's hear it," he said. Rubin's voice was rising. "If Ron Goldman and Hank LaBrie and Joachim Maitre should be pariahs, then let's pick them all up and tar them and feather them."

"What position are our directors in when they are forced to take sides?" Rubin asked. "Let's each take sides and know what we are going to the ramparts for."

Rubin stopped. He looked around the faculty conference room. "I'm sorry," he said, lowering his voice. "Forgive me. This is something that has been bothering me deeply."

Associate professor Gerald Powers was next.

"I'd like to support what Professor Rubin put so eloquently," Powers said. "A lot of the faculty are in the dark and don't know what's going on, and it reminds me of the Soviet Union."

The whole thing made David A. Klatell, director of the department of journalism and a Redmont loyalist, sick. Literally. Klatell resigned on March 26, claiming that the stress of the departmental conflict had exacerbated a long-term illness.

It got to the point where people were fighting about everything, Klatell says now. "There were nasty memos accusing me of all kinds of things. I was physically harassed. Finally I just stepped down."

On Monday, July 7, Dean Bernard Redmont resigned.

Provost Jon Westling says that it would be inappropriate for him to comment on what happened between him and Redmont. But sources familiar with Redmont's position say he resigned because of a difference of opinion with President Silber and Provost Westling. The conflict, they say, centered on the Afghan Media Project.

Silber did not rush to set up a search committee for a new dean for the College of Communication. He waited until Maitre returned from a fact-finding mission in Peshawar, then on August 12 appointed him interim dean. Joachim Maitre, Silber's ski instructor, not only had the Afghan project, he had a chance to run his own college.

And one of the first things he did was to reinstate associate dean Ronald Goldman.

LAST SEPTEMBER, MICHAEL GARTNER, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and editor of the *Courier-Journal*, in Louisville, and the *Louisville Times*, wrote to Hearst's King Features Syndicate president, Joe D'Angelo: "If it's true, as reported, that King Features has taken \$510,000 from the United States Information Agency to create

an 'Afghan news agency,' I, for one, am plenty disturbed. As an editor, how can I rely on a syndicate that is in bed with the U.S. propaganda agency? ... I think it's bad for American journalism, and I doubt that it's good for King Features."

King Features was plenty disturbed by Gartner's letter. Shortly after its arrival, the syndicate dropped its share of the Afghan Project.

King Features' cold feet only fired up Joachim Maitre. What D'Angelo dropped—that part of the project worth \$510,000 to set up a distribution network for the news written by the newly trained refugees—Maitre caught. BU ended up with the whole show, and Maitre was ready to roll. But he had a problem. Henry LaBrie, his print-training director, had dropped out, and no one else in the journalism department was willing to go.

LaBrie was a 40-year-old assistant professor who had been teaching journalism at BU for six years and was hoping for tenure. Most people at COM are reluctant to talk about LaBrie now. They say they don't know why he got into the project or why he got out. But they told me where I could find him: on his farm up in Kennebunkport, Maine.

LaBrie was tossing bales of hay around his barn when I pulled up. He's a wide-eyed, friendly man who was wearing a green John Deere cap pulled over a nest of curly black hair. He stoked up the wood-burning stove and we sat down at his kitchen table.

Recently, LaBrie said, he had been reading about the New World Information Order, a school of thought that argues that the vast preponderance of information sent swirling around the globe is generated by a handful of countries with political and technological clout. He said he saw the Afghan Media Project as a chance to change that, a chance to create an indigenous Afghan press.

LaBrie had helped draft the concept paper, and then chose to work mainly on Maitre's proposal rather than on Redmont's. Then, last summer after Maitre was made dean, he told LaBrie that it would improve his chances for tenure if he went to Pakistan and wrote a primer on Afghan journalism. And more than anything, LaBrie wanted tenure.

Then, LaBrie said, Maitre began acting strange. He wouldn't see him; he wouldn't fill him in on the state of the project.

"Finally, I go to this freshman colloquium," recalled LaBrie. "I think on September 25, Maitre's sitting a couple of tables over. So after the presentation, Maitre comes over and passes me this note. It says, 'Henk, are you ready? Get vaccination, visa, depart on twenty-seventh.'"

"I figure this is incredible. It's Tuesday. He doesn't tell me anything all summer, and now he wants me to leave on Sunday. I was in a state of shock."

LaBrie asked if Nick Mills, who had signed on to teach photography, would be going with him. Maitre said no. LaBrie was going alone. He asked what he was supposed to do when he got there. Maitre told him he was to meet a man who would be carrying a small bag, a man who needed help with his writing skills. LaBrie didn't know what to think. Perhaps Maitre just wanted to get somebody over there to show the USIA that the program was moving ahead.

LaBrie wanted to know more. He wanted Maitre to be more forthcoming with him. So he set up a meeting with Maitre, Goldman, and Smith for 5 p.m. on Wednesday, September 24.

LaBrie said he was 15 or 20 minutes late for the meeting and that when he knocked on Maitre's door, no one answered.

"So I called Ron's [Goldman's] house," LaBrie said. No answer. "Then I called Jake's [Smith's] house. He's not there. His wife answered. All ready to hang up, she says, 'Here's Jake, just walked in the door.'"

"I ask, 'What's going on? I thought we had a meeting.' He says, 'We did, but you were late. We were there.' He says, 'Ron and Maitre are probably still in there drinking beer.' I go back up, and just as I get there I see Goldman walking out. I ask if Maitre's in there and he says, 'Yes, but he won't see you.' I say, 'We had a meeting.' He says, 'I know, but he won't see you. He's working on another project.'"

The new dean's snub left LaBrie confused and annoyed. He felt as if he was being toyed with. The next day, he says, even though he figured it would cost him tenure, he bowed out of the Afghan project.

LaBrie said he had planned to spend most of the fall semester in Pakistan, so he hadn't booked any classes. He said he'd love to get back to teaching, but he didn't see it happening. He's living in Maine, selling cords of wood and bales of hay, and finishing up a course in real estate sales.

LaBrie asked me what I thought of Maitre.

"I met him only once," I said.

"Where was that?" LaBrie asked.

I told him it was in an empty office in the basement of COM, the office next to Larry Martin's.

"That used to be my office," said Henry LaBrie.

**M**Y LAST MEETING WITH JOACHIM Maitre took place in the large, wood-paneled corner office that used to be Bernard Redmont's. I asked Maitre why he didn't answer his door when LaBrie knocked.

"I was trying to teach him responsibility," Maitre said. "If I have a meeting with somebody at 5 o'clock and he comes at 5:20, I cannot accept that."

"But you were in here drinking beer."

"Total nonsense," said Maitre. "We had a meeting at 5 o'clock and he did not come."

I asked Maitre about the big issue: doesn't he worry that the Afghan Media Project will be perceived as a USIA propaganda initiative, not as a legitimate educational program? After all, when an Associated Press reporter last summer asked Senator Humphrey, who sponsored the bill that appropriated \$500,000 for the project, if he thought it was propaganda, Humphrey said, "If we train freedom fighters in the use of cameras to bring out footage that might help raise international public outrage, it's propaganda in the best sense of the word."

Maitre answered with a question. "How can I guarantee that my students here at Boston University will not get their B.A.'s, go into the world, and join the Communist *Daily Worker*?"

Maitre had a point. You never know how students will use the skills you teach them. But his answer struck a distant chord. I remembered reading that when Bernard Redmont was put on the stand during the Remington trial 35 years ago, government prosecutors asked him whether any of his writings had ever appeared in the *Daily Worker*. The prosecutors in that case were later admonished by the U.S. Court of Appeals for improper questioning.

I left Maitre's office and wandered through the halls of my old school. The glass display cases of the college were filled with artifacts from Afghan refugees. Crayon drawings by third-grade refugees depicted freedom fighters crouched behind boulders while Soviet tanks roll by. Posters besought me to attend COM's Afghan Cultural Fair. The campaign was in full swing.

When BU's student paper, the *Daily Free Press*, ran a story about the Afghan Media Project that described Goldman's research into Redmont's past, Goldman, an associate dean of one of the country's top-ranked colleges of communication, told the editors of the student paper that some stories should never be published.

Last November, when the *Christian Science Monitor* quoted associate professor Bernice Buresh's criticism of the Afghan Media Project, Maitre wrote her a letter of reprimand. "With the purpose of damage limitation in mind," Maitre wrote, "I am sending copies of this letter to all full-time faculty of the College."

When I asked Buresh about the dean's public chastisement, she seemed less concerned about its consequences than she was about the far-reaching consequences of the media project that Maitre has fought so hard to lead. "The really horrible irony of this," she said, "may be that these poor people who participate in this may find their legitimate stories negated because they are seen as having been bought by the American propaganda organization. That is kind of a double tragedy of the whole thing."

In the end, I decided to steer clear of the Afghan Media Project. Despite the promise of adventure, it looked like a bad trip.

But it was still a good story. □